Showing posts with label Cultural hegemony. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cultural hegemony. Show all posts

18 September 2026

The Lottery of Fame

For a long time, I thought of literary success as a giant lottery. Thousands of people write books, publish them, and try to find an audience. Only a tiny fraction break through. The metaphor that came to mind was the sperm cell: millions set out, only one reaches the egg, and the rest disappear without a trace.

Literature can look much the same. A hundred writers may publish a hundred perfectly respectable books, yet perhaps only one gets a second edition, an important review, wider distribution, or the attention of influential critics. Then come the universities, the schools, the translations, the reprints. Eventually, that writer becomes “important.”

The others simply vanish.

But there is a problem with this explanation.

Who decides which sperm cells get the chance to survive?



Heidegger and the Machinery of Culture

This is where Martin Heidegger’s reflections on art and culture introduce a variable that was missing from my original metaphor.

A work does not remain alive simply because someone wrote it. It has to be preserved, interpreted, republished, taught, discussed, and passed on. It has to enter a cultural world that keeps it visible.

And that world is not neutral.

This does not necessarily mean that a handful of powerful people sit around a table and decide which books will become immortal. The reality is both less dramatic and more powerful than that.

Every age builds its cultural hierarchy through publishers, critics, newspapers, universities, schools, prizes, libraries, foundations, markets, and public institutions. Each makes countless decisions about what deserves attention and what does not.

Taken together, those decisions help create what we call the literary canon.


Power Doesn't Have to Censor You

The most interesting part is that power does not have to ban a work in order to marginalize it.

Sometimes it only has to leave it unsupported.

A book that is never reprinted becomes harder to find. A writer who is never reviewed becomes harder to discover. An author who is never studied at universities becomes harder to turn into an object of serious scholarship. A work that never makes it into the classroom is much less likely to be passed down to the next generation.

The reverse is equally true.

Once a book enters the school curriculum, millions of people may encounter it simply because an institution has placed it in front of them.

At that point something remarkable happens:

fame begins to look natural, even though it has been built through a long chain of decisions.


Publishers Decide What Gets a Shot

Before the classroom comes the publisher.

Every year, an enormous number of manuscripts are written. But publishing space is limited. Editors have to decide what gets published, how much money to put behind it, how many copies to print, how aggressively to market it, where to distribute it, and whether to keep investing in the author.

Talent is only one factor.

The genre matters. The market matters. The timing matters. The expected audience matters. An author's connections and public profile may matter. So does the possibility of turning a book into a media event.

A manuscript sitting in a drawer cannot compete with a book backed by a national distribution network.

Not necessarily because it is worse.

Simply because it never got the same shot.


The Market Doesn't Just Discover Taste. It Shapes It.

This also complicates the familiar idea that the market merely discovers what people already want.

The market can help create what people eventually learn to want.

If a publisher spends heavily promoting an author, gets the book into bookstores, newspapers, podcasts, television programs, literary festivals, and social media, that author gains a level of visibility that an equally talented writer without that machinery is unlikely to achieve.

Then the sales figures arrive.

“The public chose the book.”

Perhaps.

But the public chose it after someone had made sure the public knew it existed.

That distinction matters.


Universities Confer Legitimacy

Then there is academia.

Universities do not simply study whatever happens to exist. They also help determine what is worth studying.

An author becomes the subject of dissertations, conferences, academic papers, courses, and scholarly debates. Specialists emerge. Those specialists produce more scholarship. The bibliography grows.

And a self-reinforcing cycle begins:

A work is considered important. It is studied. More scholarship is produced about it. Its academic importance grows. It is taught. It enters textbooks. It becomes part of the canon.

Recognition creates more recognition.

That does not necessarily mean manipulation. It is an institutional process.

But the consequence is real: once an author is inside the canon, that author has far more opportunities to remain there than a writer who never got inside in the first place.


Schools Turn the Canon Into Collective Memory

School is where the process becomes especially powerful.

A writer taught to millions of students is no longer simply an author. That writer becomes part of collective memory.

Entire generations encounter the same names, the same poems, the same novels, the same historical narratives. The next generation then inherits them already labeled as “important.”

At that point, the original cultural choice can become almost invisible.

A student learns that Dante is a great writer.

But the historical question is not whether Dante deserves to be read. It is:

How did Dante come to occupy this particular place in our cultural memory, and how has that position been reinforced and reinterpreted over the centuries?

The same question can be asked about Shakespeare, Goethe, Cervantes, Manzoni, and countless others.

Their literary value was not necessarily invented by institutions. But their position in the cultural hierarchy is also the product of a long history of selection, interpretation, preservation, and transmission.


This Is Where Gramsci Comes Back In

This is where Antonio Gramsci's concept of cultural hegemony becomes useful.

A ruling class does not have to dictate every idea directly. It can help create an environment in which certain values, assumptions, and ways of seeing the world become dominant.

Applied to literature, this does not mean that “the powerful write the books we are told to read.”

It means something more subtle.

The institutions through which a society produces and transmits culture do not exist outside that society's structures of power.

Publishing, academia, education, journalism, the market, and cultural institutions are all embedded in history.

And every historical period therefore tends to elevate certain works while leaving others in the shadows.


The Most Powerful Part of the Canon Is That It Looks Natural

Perhaps the greatest power of a canon is that, once established, it stops looking like something that was constructed.

A student walks into a classroom and encounters Dante, Petrarch, Manzoni, and Leopardi. The student does not ask who decided these were the authors worth studying. They are simply presented as “the greats.”

There is nothing inherently wrong with having a canon. A society needs a cultural inheritance. We cannot reinvent the entire library every morning.

But there is a legitimate question hiding underneath it:

How many writers disappeared because they never gained access to the institutions capable of preserving and transmitting their work?

And how many survived not only because of their talent, but because they happened to benefit from historical circumstances that allowed their work to be preserved?

That question does not destroy the canon.

It puts the canon back into history.


Famous Yesterday, Forgotten Today

History is full of reminders that fame is temporary.

Tommaso Grossi was a major literary celebrity in nineteenth-century Italy. Today he is far less familiar to the general public than Manzoni. Giovanni Prati was a widely known poet in his own time; today he is primarily read by specialists.

Outside Italy, Marie Corelli was one of the bestselling authors of the Victorian era. Today, her name is largely absent from popular literary culture.

And then there is the opposite phenomenon.

Moby-Dick by Herman Melville did not immediately acquire the canonical status it enjoys today. Melville's reputation declined dramatically during his lifetime, and his major literary rehabilitation came later.

So the present is not necessarily capable of telling us what the future will remember.

Fame is a snapshot.

The canon is a sediment.

Memory is a selection process that can continue for centuries.


The Real Lottery Begins After Fame

This forces me to revise my original sperm-cell metaphor.

I once imagined that the great lottery was the one that took a writer from obscurity to fame.

Perhaps that is only the first lottery.

The real selection begins afterward.

A writer must first be published, then read, then reprinted, then reviewed, then studied, then taught, and eventually rediscovered and reinterpreted by later generations.

At every stage, writers fall away.

And in the end, only a tiny number remain.

They are not necessarily just the best. They are the ones that managed to survive a long chain of historical selections.

Talent may be necessary.

But talent alone is not enough.

Someone has to open the door. Someone has to invest. Someone has to promote. Someone has to teach. Someone has to preserve. Someone has to rediscover.


So Who Gets to Decide What We Remember?

This does not mean that every great writer has a powerful puppeteer pulling the strings. That would be an easy explanation—and often an impossible one to prove.

The reality is more unsettling precisely because it does not require a conspiracy.

Those who control the mechanisms of cultural transmission possess a measure of power over what a society will remember.

Publishers decide what gets a place in the market. Critics help determine what deserves attention. The market determines what can be financially sustained. Universities determine what receives scholarship. Schools determine what millions of young people encounter. Institutions preserve some works and neglect others. Later generations decide what deserves to be rediscovered.

What we call “culture” is therefore not only the spontaneous accumulation of humanity's greatest achievements.

It is also the result of an enormous, largely invisible process of selection.

And that changes the problem for the writer.

The challenge is not simply to get published.

It is to survive cultural selection.

Being published means entering the present.

Being famous means belonging to your own time.

Being remembered means surviving the market, institutions, intellectual fashions, political interests, changing tastes—and ultimately, death.

Perhaps that is the hardest form of literary success of all:

not winning the lottery of your own age, but surviving the lottery of the ages that come after you.

22 July 2026

The Political Hierarchy of Crime: Security, Consent, and the Construction of Illegality

The contemporary securitarian right tends to build its political narrative around street crime: burglary, muggings, robbery, illegal occupation of property, and urban disorder. This is not merely a matter of criminal justice policy; it is a specific way of constructing a public problem. As Michel Foucault argued, power does not simply repress crime—it selects which forms of illegality should be made visible and which should be tolerated, managed, or relegated to the background. Criminal law does not pursue every form of illegality with the same intensity; rather, it establishes a hierarchy of offenses that reflects the political and economic equilibrium of a given society.

This hierarchy is not produced by state institutions alone. It is also the outcome of a cultural process. Antonio Gramsci described hegemony as the capacity of a ruling bloc to present its worldview as natural, universal, and consistent with common sense. From this perspective, public security is not simply a government policy but a powerful narrative that shapes how society identifies threats. When political debate focuses overwhelmingly on street crime, citizens are encouraged to perceive the pickpocket, burglar, or mugger as the primary danger, while more complex and systemic forms of criminality fade into the background of public consciousness.

Organized crime presents a striking paradox. Although its economic, political, and institutional impact is vastly greater than that of petty crime, it often generates less public anxiety. Criminal organizations typically avoid indiscriminate violence, preferring instead to infiltrate legitimate businesses, public procurement, financial markets, real estate, and money-laundering networks. Their strength lies precisely in their ability to become invisible, blending illicit capital into legal economic circuits.


Diego Gambetta famously argued that the mafia is not merely a criminal organization but a business that supplies private protection where trust and the rule of law are weak. In this sense, organized crime does not exist outside capitalism; it exploits capitalism's contradictions, operating within its grey areas and establishing mutually beneficial relationships with actors fully integrated into the legal economy.

David Garland, in turn, described contemporary societies as characterized by a "culture of control," in which security functions not only as a practical necessity but also as a symbolic political resource. Crime becomes a powerful instrument of political mobilization. Yet this culture focuses primarily on offenses that provoke immediate fear and emotional reactions. Financial crime, systemic corruption, corporate fraud, and money laundering, despite causing far greater economic and social damage, remain less visible and therefore less effective as instruments for generating political consensus.

Loïc Wacquant interprets this development as part of the broader transformation of the modern state. As governments retreat from social welfare, they increasingly reinforce their penal function, making public security a central source of political legitimacy. The policing of urban marginality therefore acquires a symbolic dimension: it reassures the electorate by projecting the image of a strong and active state, even when the structural causes of crime remain largely unaddressed.

From a Gramscian perspective, security itself becomes a mechanism of cultural hegemony. Political consent is secured not only through coercion but also by shaping what society considers urgent, dangerous, and morally unacceptable. The fight against street crime becomes a powerful marker of political identity, while economic and financial criminality—precisely because it is less visible and often intertwined with elite interests—struggles to occupy the center of public debate.

This does not imply that conservative governments deliberately ignore organized crime. Law enforcement agencies and the judiciary continue to devote substantial resources to combating criminal organizations. The point is rather that public discourse often privileges street crime because it generates an immediate perception of insecurity. A burglary, a mugging, or a robbery directly affects everyday life and transforms people's relationship with public space. A sophisticated international money-laundering scheme, by contrast, may move billions of dollars and distort entire sectors of the economy while remaining largely invisible to ordinary citizens.

The result is a profound asymmetry of perception: the crimes that generate the greatest public fear are not necessarily those that inflict the greatest social harm. Legal and illegal economies are not isolated universes but interconnected systems through which capital, interests, and influence constantly flow. Through money laundering, shell companies, offshore financial structures, and apparently legitimate investments, criminal wealth can be absorbed into the global economy, making the boundary between lawful and unlawful capital increasingly difficult to distinguish.

Following the 2008 global financial crisis, several magistrates, financial investigators, and international observers suggested that the enormous liquidity held by transnational criminal organizations may, in some contexts, have found its way into parts of the financial system facing severe liquidity shortages. While this remains a debated hypothesis rather than an established explanation of the crisis itself, it points to a broader structural issue: contemporary capitalism and organized crime are not always opposing spheres. Under certain conditions, they may develop relationships of interdependence, convenience, and mutual functionality.

From this perspective, security becomes both a technology of government and an instrument of cultural hegemony. It does more than organize the repression of crime; it determines which fears are considered legitimate and which forms of illegality deserve sustained political and media attention. The distinction between street crime and white-collar crime is therefore not merely legal but profoundly political. The former produces visible insecurity; the latter undermines markets, institutions, and democratic governance itself. Yet it is street crime that dominates political rhetoric because fear remains one of the most effective mechanisms for building political consent.

Ultimately, the hierarchy of crime does not necessarily reflect the objective gravity of different offenses. Rather, it reflects the ways in which power constructs cultural hegemony by deciding which forms of illegality should be seen, feared, and punished—and which should remain largely invisible despite their far-reaching consequences.

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