Europe’s Limited Sovereignty After 1945

When, on a cold morning on 24 October 1945, Vidkun Quisling was executed at Oslo’s Akershus Fortress, many Europeans believed that the end of the Second World War had also marked the end of an era of collaborationist governments and regimes imposed by foreign powers. Liberation from Nazi-Fascist rule appeared to open the way towards a new political age based on representative democracy, popular sovereignty, and the self-determination of nations.

The reality of post-war Europe, however, was far more complex. The continent emerging from the conflict was not a Europe completely free to determine its own strategic choices: it was a divided continent, shaped by opposing spheres of influence, as became evident with the beginning of the Cold War.

In Eastern Europe, the presence of the Red Army led to the establishment of communist regimes closely linked to the Soviet Union. From Poland to Romania and Bulgaria, and in the newly created German Democratic Republic, governments existed that were formally national but politically integrated into Moscow’s sphere of influence. State sovereignty was therefore conditioned by the geopolitical balance created after the Allied victory.

Breznev and Honecker Kiss

Yet Western Europe was not entirely free from external constraints either. Countries that had emerged defeated from the war, especially Germany and Italy, found themselves in a unique position: on one side, they built democratic institutions based on free elections and constitutional systems; on the other, they operated within an international order in which the major strategic decisions were inevitably influenced by the victorious powers.

West Germany was created under the strong supervision and influence of the United States, Great Britain, and France, and its membership in NATO defined its strategic role until reunification in 1990. The Federal Republic of Germany was undoubtedly a democracy, but a democracy integrated into a specific international order, one largely shaped by Washington.

Italy’s post-war republic was born in a similar context. The Armistice of Cassibile in 1943 represented the decisive break with the Axis powers and the beginning of Italy’s alignment with the Allies, but it also left the country in a position of extreme political and military weakness. Post-war Italy had to rebuild its institutions while operating under the influence of the victorious powers.

The Atlantic choice, formalized by Italy’s accession to NATO in 1949, guaranteed security and stability during a period marked by the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, it inevitably limited Italy’s room for strategic autonomy. The presence of American military bases, even though integrated into the NATO framework, became one of the most visible aspects of this reality.

The  Three Masters

Nevertheless, the deepest issue does not concern only military matters, but also a political and cultural dimension: the gradual acceptance of a subordinate role within the international order. For decades, part of the Italian political class operated with the awareness that the major decisions regarding foreign policy, security, and economics were strongly influenced by forces beyond the national debate.

This does not mean denying the existence of Italian democracy, free elections, or political pluralism. It means recognizing that the democracies of post-war Europe developed within a precise geopolitical framework, in which national autonomy was inevitably connected to the requirements of international alliances.

The Italian political history of the second half of the twentieth century must therefore also be understood within this broader context. The confrontation between different political forces — from Christian Democracy to Socialists and Communists — took place within a world divided into opposing blocs. The events concerning relations with Tito’s Yugoslavia, the eastern border question, and the Treaty of Osimo demonstrate how national issues were often intertwined with much larger international dynamics.

The history of post-war Italy is therefore also the history of a constant search for balance between national sovereignty and membership in wider international systems. A challenge that does not concern Italy alone, but Europe as a whole.

The European turning point 

Today, Europe remains a major economic and political area, but it still does not represent an autonomous centre of power comparable to the United States or other global powers. The European Union possesses significant economic and regulatory influence, yet in many strategic fields — from security to energy, from technology to finance — it remains affected by external dynamics.

Within this framework, the United Kingdom, often considered less central after Brexit, continues to maintain a significant role thanks to the global importance of the City of London and its historical, diplomatic, and strategic connections with the Anglo-Saxon world.

The fundamental question of our time is therefore not only who formally governs states, but how much real freedom democracies still possess in determining their own destiny.

The history of Europe since 1945 can also be interpreted as the history of this permanent tension: between independence and interdependence, between declared sovereignty and exercised sovereignty.